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Abstract
This paper sheds light on the reasons that explain the dissatisfactions because of 
the behavioralist dominance within American political science academia. I show 
how and why the flaws and failures of the behavioralist analysis have created 
more room for the emergence of alternative approaches or new ideological
movements in the study of politics. These competing paradigms or approaches are 
mainly post-behavioralism, postmodernism, and the Perestroika movement. 
Moreover, under a comparative framework, I explain why behavioralism is still 
the dominant paradigm within American political science academia despite all the 
efforts of the alternative paradigms to displace it.
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Overview
Behavioralism is the dominant orientation in contemporary political 
science in the United States. Before the emergence of behavioralism (1930s), the 
discipline had been dominated by dispersed approaches based on political history, 
the study of constitutions and legalistic procedures, and the legal structures of 
institutions such as legislatures, executives, and courts. The emergent 
behavioralists argued that these previous approaches did not provide us with 
reliable knowledge. Moreover, these scholars pointed out that reliable knowledge 
could only be achieved through the study of observed behavior and the use of 
scientific methods (Isaak, 1981).
Under this new paradigm, the use of scientific methods must satisfy all 
Popper’s scientific requirements: testability, falsifiability, neutrality, and 
tentativity (Ricci, 1984).i   Because of the expansion of this emergent 
behavioralism, the strong influence of economics and its individualistic 
assumptions, and perhaps, an increasing dissatisfaction with the weak explanatory 
capacity of the former approaches of the discipline, several political scientists 
started to explain social and political phenomena through methodological 
approaches developed in economics, such as econometrics, rational choice and 
game theory. This new generation of political scientists considered behavioralism 
and its methods attractive for two reasons.  First, political scientists set up a 
method to distance themselves from normative political philosophy.  They
achieved this goal by using the notion of “best means” to explain actors’ behavior 
in pursuing a given end.  Second, these researchers found a new and potentially 
powerful way to address generalizations on actors’ behavior.
Thus, to achieve their goals, behavioralists have basically developed two 
different methodological approaches in order to make generalizations.  First, these 
scholars implemented an extensive use of econometric and statistical techniques. 
By decomposing the world into workable chunks, behavioralists attempt to 
construct logical structures that connect and relate variables to explain a particular 
phenomenon.  Their final goal is to measure and calculate the degree of causality 
that exists between two or more variables. This exercise allows them to confirm
or deny any hypothesis on actors or institutions’ behavior (Isaak, 1981).
The second approach, called “rational choice”, is based on the assumption 
of rationality, which conceives of actors as utility-maximizers subject to some 
constraints imposed by the world.  The approach is methodologically 
individualist, yet its focus is not on individual choice but on the aggregation of 
individual choices (Levi, 1997).  Through the use of mathematics and deductive 
techniques, they aspire to construct models that can explain and predict behavior
and make generalizations on particular types of political phenomena. Models with 
more explanatory power replace previous models, which become flawed because 
of their limited explanatory scope. The repeated exercise has encouraged rational 
choice scholars to perfect their models, theories, and predictions (Lalman,
Oppenheimer & Swistak, 1993). With this argument, behavioralists state that
“knowledge” is cumulative and achieved through the use of scientific methods.
After a few decades of development, the rational choice approach has 
achieved a dominant position within American political science academia. 
Rational choice has taken over political science professional journals and several 
mathematical courses are generally required for graduate students. For example, 
one recent count put the percentage of rational choice articles in the most 
important American journal of politics (American Political Science Review) at 
about 40 percent (Cohn, 1999).
Thus, through these two methodologies, econometrics and rational choice, 
behavioralism has become the dominant paradigm in the discipline. However, this 
dominance has been questioned by several scholars from different traditions. 
These critics have focused on the lack of responsibility of “political action”
among political scientists, flaws in epistemological and ideological aspects of 
behavioralism, the explanatory limitations of the behavioralist methodologies, the 
concept of accumulation of “knowledge”, and the lack of methodological 
pluralism in the most important American organization of the discipline (APSA) 
due to the behavioralist predominance.ii
This paper will shed light on the reasons that explain this dissatisfaction, 
and also, its consequences. I will show how and why the flaws and failures of the 
behavioralist analysis have created more room for the emergence of alternative
approaches or new ideological movements in the discipline. These competing 
paradigms or approaches are mainly post-behavioralism, postmodernism, and the 
Perestroika movement. Finally, under a comparative framework, I explain why 
behavioralism is still the dominant paradigm within American political science 
academia despite all the efforts of the alternative paradigms to displace it.
The Post-behavioralist challenge
The first reason for dissatisfaction came with the rigid concept of 
neutrality. During the 1960s, a group of scholars, led by David Easton (1969), 
called for action and relevance in the discipline. This movement is called post- 
behavioralism. These scholars believed that with “knowledge” must come the 
responsibility of “action”.  Based on these assumptions, this group of scholars, 
called post-behavioralists, criticized the behavioralist indifference to face the 
increasing social and political crisis that the international community was 
experiencing during those years. The threat of a nuclear holocaust and the 
increasing totalitarianism were the two main concerns for this new wave of 
American political scientists.
Easton and this group of political scientists also declared its dissatisfaction 
for the excessive use of methods borrowed from the natural sciences.  Easton saw 
that methods and techniques were more important than substance under the 
behavioralist paradigm. Instead, Easton argued that “If one must be sacrificed for
the other-and this need not always be so-it is more important to be relevant and 
meaningful for contemporary urgent social problems than to be sophisticated in 
the tools of investigation.”
The main problem with discussing post-behavioralism is that this school 
cannot be defined as a coherent movement within American academia. Aside 
from some oblique references to it, we cannot argue with any certainty that any 
distinct movement known as post-behavioralism has ever existed in the discipline 
(Graham and Carey, 1972). Rather, post-behavioralism can only be said to exist 
insofar as the behavioral era has been followed by an era in which political 
scientists undertake research in a markedly different way and a slightly altered 
methodology has accompanied this new approach.  Thus, the lack of a clear 
alternative methodology and a cohesive organization among post-behavioralists 
diminished the impact of this emerging approach within American academia. 
Therefore, despite their attempts, post-behavioralists could not alter the 
behavioralist dominance in the discipline.
Epistemological and methodological concerns. Kuhn and the postmodernist 
alternative
Perhaps the most successful attacks on the behavioralist doctrine have 
been focused on its most basic assumptions and principles: the concept of 
accumulation of “knowledge”, its explanatory and methodological procedures,
and its epistemological and ideological assumptions.  First, the notion of 
accumulation of knowledge has always been problematic for behavioralists. 
Probably the main attack on this behavioralist argument came from Thomas Kuhn 
(1970).  Kuhn argued that science does not progress by the piecemeal 
accumulation of knowledge. Instead, scientific development and change occurs 
through scientific revolutions. Thus, according to Kuhn, during scientific 
revolutions, scientists perceive the world of their research-engagement differently. 
As a consequence, after a revolution, scientists are responding to a totally
different world based on their new perceptions.
Kuhn’s perspective clearly undermined the behavioralist notion of 
scientific development, which claims that science is built by a slow and piecemeal 
accumulation of relevant theories and data. Therefore, the cumulative theory of
the behavioralists was certainly subject to Kuhn’s critique, but so was the idea of
a social science itself, since Kuhn indicated that social science does not yet appear 
to have developed any paradigms at all (15). Political science, then, is pre- 
scientific by Kuhn’s account.
Clearly, Kuhn supported his theory by using the notion of perceptions, 
which determines a “scientific revolution”.  The same concept has inspired many 
other scholars and traditions to threaten the behavioralist dominance within 
American political science academia.  These approaches, which have usually been 
grouped under the label of “postmodernism”, are highly diverse in their
epistemologies and subject matters (Coles, 2002). What they all have in common 
is their rejection and criticism of scientific and objectivist trends in behavioral 
political science (Reid & Yanarella, 1974).  Another possible way to establish a 
common feature among these approaches is through a notion they all share: the 
concept of critique.  For postmodernists, to get involved in “critique” means to 
search and expose the internal, marginalized, contradictory, and hidden tensions 
in social, political, and economic phenomena.iii   Following this exercise of
“critique”, postmodernists have criticized many of the postulates and assumptions 
of behavioralism. These critiques have been focused on epistemological, 
methodological, and ideological aspects of behavioralism.
First, related to epistemology, behavioralist scholars defend the idea of 
neutrality and objectivity in order to produce knowledge. However, achieving a 
complete separation between subject and object (the dichotomy subject-object) 
has been an unattainable task, and consequently, it has become a sensitive 
dilemma for behavioralists.  On the other hand, postmodernists not only eliminate 
the dichotomy subject-object, but also state that “reality” is endogenously defined 
by the perceptions of the subject, unlike behavioralists who consider preferences 
and perceptions as exogenously given variables (“structure of preferences”).
These different definitions of “reality” have led to different 
epistemological conceptions of knowledge.  Thus, while behavioralist scholars 
have pursued objective knowledge, postmodernists conceive a body of 
knowledge (of multiple “realities”) that depends on the multiple perceptions and 
interpretations of the subjects. Thus, postmodernists have released us from
the behavioralist rigidity to interpret or analyze political phenomena. This 
postmodernist’s refusal to erect any criteria for analyzing theories implies a 
relativism that offers limitless interpretations of the polity (Rosenau, 1990).
Second, ideologically, behavioralists are heirs of the English school of 
liberalism. Since their beginnings, liberals have considered democracy as the most 
compatible regime type with their ideology and normative assumptions. However, 
this normative presupposition often has generated conflicts with the notions of 
objectivity and neutrality when “scientific findings” oppose democratic values 
(Ricci, 1984). Thus, the behavioralist research agenda and its findings have been 
conditioned and influenced by the ideological framework of liberalism.iv   Because 
these normative assumptions are not present in the postmodernist literature, this 
approach has allowed its scholars to work without this constraint.
Relevant differences between behavioralism and postmodernism are not 
only connected to epistemological and ideological aspects, but also to 
methodological features. Postmodernists assume that the world does not exist in 
an objective suspension but enjoys a property of “meaningfulness” which human
beings assign to its manifestations as they see fit.  Under this concept, meaning 
can only be understood when the world is evaluated as the sum of its related parts 
(Ricci, 1984). Thus, the behavioralist methodology of decomposing the world into 
workable chunks was challenged by the postmodernist paradigm.
Other sources for critiques on methodology are related to the nature of the 
subject of study of the discipline, the degree of recurrence of scientific 
experiments in the discipline, and the amount of empirical data. First, because of 
the lack of predictable and systematic behavior of human beings, to draw 
generalizations from the world of politics becomes a hard task (Isaak, 1985). 
Second, some critics claim that most of the behavioralist propositions are rarely 
checked by rigorous and scientific experiments. Instead, they are analyzed on the 
basis of logical and terminological arguments (Ricci, 1984).
Third, in certain areas with a great diversity of types of actors, constraints, 
and incentives, the rational choice approach has failed to make relevant 
generalizations in applying the assumption of ceteris paribus.  Under these 
scenarios, rational analysis sometimes cannot explain more than one case without 
the necessity of changing assumptions or adapting the model to a new case.
Finally, data becomes scarce for testing models if researchers cannot have 
access to it or when certain political phenomena have not been recurring.  All 
these behavioralist weaknesses and rigidities have been capitalized on by 
postmodernist approaches in order to find a visible position in the discipline.
Behavioralists have counter-attacked these arguments. They contend that 
critical theorists deal with “black boxes,” where there is no way to clearly identify 
causal relationships among a small set of variables or political actors. This 
postmodernist vision of addressing reality has led behavioralist scholars to 
consider this approach useless and lacking of practical applications for 
policymakers, or simply to ignore the postmodernist claims. Behavioralists argue 
that postmodernist theories do not serve as inputs for policy makers and
politicians to implement policies. In fact, because of this argument, behavioralists 
usually argue that the postmodernist schools have not contributed to either 
building a solid body of cumulative knowledge or understanding the simplest 
practical relationships of causality among a few actors or variables in the polity.
These simple facts could explain why post-modernists have been 
unsuccessful in securing research funds.  The financial constraints also suggest 
some uncertainty over postmodernism’s future.  Finally, behavioralists argue that 
the complicated postmodernist philosophical language, the extensive use of 
jargons, and the relatively limited diffusion of postmodernist theories in courses 
or journals have also constrained its diffusion and practice (Ricci, 1984).
Although the postmodernist schools have attempted to fill the 
behavioralist voids with diverse and attractive epistemological and 
methodological approaches, they have not been able to expand and find a solid 
position within American political science academia.  Thus, the absence of a
cumulative body of knowledge, their lack of practical applications, their financial 
constraints, their excessive use of professional jargon, and their limited diffusion 
can explain why postmodernism has not been able to displace behavioralism as 
the dominant paradigm in the discipline.
The Perestroika movement
The third main expression of dissatisfaction comes from a recent and 
spontaneous movement of scholars within the political science community. This 
group of scholars, called "Perestroika-Glasnost", has challenged many APSA’s 
policies and practices.  These scholars argue that APSA and its main journal 
APSR had become dominated with a very narrow vision of science, which is 
destructive to the profession as a whole.v    The behavioralist vision of the 
discipline has been tied with near-obsession with statistical methods and the 
rational choice approach. Related to the consequences of this near-obsession with
methodology, Gregory Kasza (2000) states, “this over preoccupation with method 
and research design has taken precedence over contributions to knowledge about 
politics.”  Thus, for Kasza and other supporters of this movement, the over
interest for methods caused that many of the studies were both uninteresting and 
futile.
In response, the APSA central administration has been quite sympathetic 
to the concerns of the narrowness of the APSR. The Association is worried that
disaffection with the APSR is undermining APSA as an institution (Steinmo,
2000). Through multiple channels, APSA has attempted to provide information to 
justify its actions.  For example, Ada Finifter (2000), the former editor of APSR, 
argued that most of the critiques that the journal has received are unjustified. 
Finifter pointed out that each manuscript is put through the same rigorous 
evaluation conducted by a group of scholars who do analogous research. 
According to her, the number of reviewers is very large, and consequently, APSA 
authorities could hardly favor one particular academic orientation in the journal. 
Finally, Finifter argued that the protesters usually submit relatively few 
manuscripts and there is no evidence that their acceptance rate is lower than those 
of other authors.
In order to balance and evaluate the accuracy of these two antagonistic 
positions, I have selected two volumes of APSR as a representative sample.vi  The 
total number of articles in these volumes is 78. After evaluating the contents of 
these articles carefully, I present this chart, which summarizes my findings:
Chart 1. Number of articles per field and methodology
Field / 
Methodology
Quantitative Qualitative Total
Statistical
Methods
Rational 
choice 
American
Politics
14 2 7 23
Methodology as 
a separate field
1 1 2 4
International
Relations
2 5 3 10
Political Theory 0 0 7 7
Comparative
Politics
20 7 7 34
Total 37 15 26 78
52
Source: American Political Science Association Review.  Volume 96, numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4; and Volume
97, numbers 1,2, 3 and 4
From this chart, I can draw some conclusions. First, the dominant 
methodology is quantitative (around 66.6% of the total sample). This category 
includes both empirical methodologies: the use of econometrics and the 
applications of the rational choice principles. The use of rational choice only 
represents 19.2% of the total sample.vii   Only in twenty six articles (33.3% of the 
sample), a qualitative method is clearly dominant. This fact confirms the main 
claim of the Perestroika protestors who argue that the dominant methodology is 
predominantly quantitative in the top journal of the discipline. Moreover, all the 
articles are positivist in essence. Therefore, there is no single article derived from 
the postmodernist perspective. Based on this fact and this sample, one of the 
disaffections with APSA might be connected to the marginal position of the 
position of the postmodernist paradigm in its most important journal.
Conclusions: comparing outcomes
It is undeniable the great dissatisfaction that exists due to the behavioralist 
dominance over American political science academia. This dissatisfaction has
also been produced by the limitations of the behavioralist analysis in providing 
accurate generalizations and predictions for all the kinds of political phenomena. 
The basic Popperian assumptions of neutrality, testability, falsifiability, and 
tentativity have created rigidities that encouraged scholars to avoid any kind of 
intervention in politics and employ an extensive use of quantitative methods and 
rational choice models, which sometimes cannot either entirely explain political 
phenomena or generalize to all settings.
Thus, each of these epistemological, methodological, and ideological 
drawbacks or limitations of behavioralism or the combination of some of them 
can explain the emergence of a competing paradigm, approach, or academic 
movement attempting to displace behavioralism as the dominant paradigm.  Thus, 
as long as behavioralism and its scientific methodologies, like econometrics and 
rational choice, cannot account for all flaws and methodological limitations in
explaining political phenomena, these alternative perspectives will remain alive in 
the discipline.
Nevertheless, all these competing approaches have failed in successfully 
challenging the dominant behavioralist position.  Like the flaws and limitations of 
behavioralism, the factors that explain these failures are also diverse.  They 
include a lack of a clear alternative methodology, absence of organizational 
cohesion in the case of post-behavioralism and the Perestroika movement, failure 
in fulfilling the demands of the market and the American government, financial 
constraints, excessive use of professional jargon, “barriers of entrance” for 
diffusion, and the absence of a cohesive and cumulative body of knowledge. Each 
of these flaws or some combinations of them can explain the unsuccessful 
attempts of these different perspectives to displace behavioralism as the dominant 
paradigm.
However, how can we explain why behavioralism was more successful 
than the other perspectives within American academia? To answer this question, a 
comparative analysis could offer interesting results. After determining all the
flaws in each perspective from behavioralism to the Perestroika movement, the 
next relevant question under a comparative framework is which characteristics are 
present in behavioralism and not in the other perspectives or movements?
The combined occurrence of two factors can answer this last question. 
First, behavioralists employ a set of methods designed to respond to the
necessities of the market and the government. Through the use of econometric 
tools, the concept of rationality, and parsimonious models, behavioralists have 
been able to predict and explain political phenomena more successfully than the 
other paradigms. Then, this comparative advantage has allowed them to secure 
grants and research funds, which then, create additional incentives for more 
scholarship.  The second factor rests on a cohesive and well-organized 
organization.  The behavioralist network is well connected and all its parts speak 
the same Popperian language. The maximum expression of this unity is the total 
control of the most important academic organization in the discipline: the 
American Political Science Association.  Thus, as long as another perspective 
cannot be more successful than behavioralism in fulfilling these two 
requirements, behavioralism will continue being the hegemonic empire within 
American political science academia.
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